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Except By Due Process of Law (i)
IVAN C. RAND "

By Cap. 44 of the Statutes of Canada, 1960, a Canadian Bill of
Rights was enacted by Parliament which in section 1 "recognizes and
declares" to "have existed" and to exist certain enumerated "fundamental rights and human freedoms" consisting of the following:
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person
and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof
except by due process of law; (b) the right of the individual to
equality before the law and the protection of the law; (c) freedom
of religion; (d) freedom of speech; (e) freedom of assembly and
association; and (f) freedom of the press. Section 2(1) provides that:
"Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an act
of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the
'Canadian Bill of Rights', be so construed and applied as not to abrogate,
abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared".

Particular rights and protections in procedure follow this general
provision, against "arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile of any
person"; against "cruel and unusual treatment and punishment";
against deprivation of a person arrested of the right "to be informed
*The Hon. Ivan C. Rand, formerly a Judge of Her Majesty's Supreme Court
of Canada, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London,
Ontario.
1 For an appreciation of Due Process, I have had the great benefit of
writings dealing with the development of that phrase in the United States
both before and after the Civil War, by Professor Edward S. Corwin, whose
mastery of the subject is indicated by articles in (1908-09), 7 Mich. Law
Reviev 643, and (1910-11), 24 Harv. Law Review 366. For the introduction to
many authorities, Professor Walter F. Dodd's Cases on ConstitutionaZ Law,
5th ed. (1954), has been of the utmost value.
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promptly of the reason", for the arrest; of the right to have counsel;
of the remedy by way of habeas corpus; of the denial of a court or
other authority to compel evidence by a person who is "denied counsel, protection against self-crimination or other constitutional
safeguards"; of the right to a fair hearing, to the presumption of
innocence, to reasonable bail, and to the assistance of an interpreter
where a party or witness does not understand or speak the language
of the proceedings. These are safeguards recognized and observed
presently in the administration of our laws; and the enumeration
serves to illustrate the general introductory provision of the section.
"Law of Canada" is by section 5 (2) declared to include every statute
of Parliament enacted as well before as after the coming into force
of the Bill of Rights, and every order, rule or regulation thereunder,
and any law in force in Canada or in any part of Canada at the
commencement of coming into force of the Bill of Rights that is
subject to be repealed, abolished or altered by the Parliament of
Canada. By section 5(3) the provisions of Part I which declare the
freedoms and furnish their protection, shall be construed to extend
only to matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament.
Section 1 exhausts its force in the declaration which it makes;
its terms are intended to define the recognized freedoms, not to furnish the means of enforcing them. In isolation the declaration would
avail nothing against new legislation; as subsequent in time, conflicting provisions would in fact be in amendment or abrogation of
it. Here we meet the difference between a written constitution as a
political and legislative foundation agreed upon by the people of a
state, and an enactment by the representative legislature of that
people; the former is recognized as of a character of enactment capable
of imposing restraints on statutory legislation and free from being
affected by it. In the case before us, the Bill of Rights is enacted
only as a statute and as no parliament can bind its own future legislative action, a declaration of rights with nothing more would be at
the mercy of subsequent action by the same legislature.
This difficulty is met by the provision of section 2. There could
be no question of ultra vires of parliamentary action in any former
or subsequent legislation; the jurisdictional power enacting the Bill
of Rights is precisely the same as that of any following enactment;
the power is one and entire and its subsequent exercise effecting
abrogation or abridgment of freedoms would be unchallengeable.
To prevent this, the device provided by section 2 is that of an interpretative direction: all law of Canada is now placed under a condition
that it is not to be deemed to violate the freedoms conferred; the
condition is in the form of an obligation placed on courts to be
observed in their interpretation of the law against the background
of the Bill of Rights. They are to construe all such law as not infringing the rights; if the interpretation finds by the language used an
infringement in fact then to the extent of that infringement the
language or fact of the law must be disregarded as if the offending
provision were omitted in the enactment of the law.
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If the language of the rule or principle or statment of law is
ambiguous, or otherwise capable of it, obviously a non-infringing
interpretation will be given; but if the language cannot fairly be so
construed, it must, in effect, be treated as meaningless and as if
struck out of the law. It might be that the entirety remaining would
lead to results not within the contemplation of the statute and in such
a case there might be a complete failure of effect The courts cannot
create new provisions which the statement of law is unable to support.
But however this may be, the significant circumstance is the adoption
of such means of giving force to the liberties proclaimed.
On the freedoms themselves, some observation is called for. The
general expression "life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment
of property" is not to be limited to freedoms other than those enumerated in section I as paras. (c) to (f) ; if "liberty", restrained within the
limits of due process, is not to be taken to include free speech, religion
and assembly, or if due process is not to be extended to qualify them,
those specific freedoms stand unconditioned and absolute. Either of
these alternatives must then be imposed on the section and the specific
freedoms brought within the general restriction. In such an enactment with the expressed purpose in its preamble of "enshrining these
principles and the human rights and fundamental freedoms derived
from them in a Bill of Rights... which shall ensure the protection
of these rights and freedoms in Canada', there is every reason that
such a construction be given. Obviously the intention is not to set
up these freedoms as absolutes even in form; and for passing upon
abridgment or infringement, a court should be given the guidance
of a standard or rule by which encroachment could be permitted to
accommodate necessary social regulation. The inherent assumptions
both of the freedoms themselves and of the society in which they
are recognized contradict such a character in them. But at what point
between the limits of the absolute and the negation is the line of
infringing encroachment to be found, the line which marks the practical adjustment between individual claims and community interests?
That point is best ascertained by the light of a rational standard.
Considering the complementary functions of sections 1 and 2,
they must, in more than the usual sense, be read together. Even in
several of the illustrations given in section 2 a standard is called
for; what is "arbitrary detention or exile"? What is the essence of
arbitrary action? How is a court to decide whether there is a sufficient rational basis for the converse of arbitrariness-reasonableness?
What is "protection against self-crimination"? Would a court be
bound to say that mere exclusion of testimony from subsequent use
against the person compelled to give it regardless of the disclosure
of facts thereafter readily discoverable and fatal to the witness was
"protection" against self-crimination? A "fair hearing" for the
determination of rights and obligations, not limited to criminal proceedings, according to "principles of fundamental justice" is declared;
by means of what rule or standard would the "fairness" or injustice
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be ascertained? These questions arising in adjudication and affecting
the means of enforcing the freedoms, in the presence of such fundamental issues, imply, in both sections, the limitations of due process,
annexed generally to "liberty", as the determinant in all cases of the
scope of permissible infringement.
This conclusion reached, the particular feature to be examined
here, then, is the scope and meaning of and the component considerations bound up in the expression "except by due process of law".
Appearing for the first time, certainly in relation to liberties and
freedoms of individuals in enactments of the Canadian Parliament,
it presents a problem of interpretation the difficulty of which will
become more apparent as the endeavour to give it meaning and content is pursued. There is no modem legislation in Great Britain or
Canada which affords assistance; but it is a phrase which during the
past 60 or 70 years has engaged, more than any other, the attention
and application of the Supreme Court of the United States as well as
many state courts. If from British and Canadian materials specific
scope of the expression could be deduced, reference to its treatment
in the United States would obviously be extremely limited in pertinency; but the actual circumstances are quite different
Not in the history of either Great Britain or Canada has there
been such a formal and specific recognition, declaration and qualification as appears in this enactment. The phrase is placed for interpretation against the background of specific liberties; the only
analogy we have, and it is an exact one, is its appearance in the
setting of American constitutionalism, both federal and state. The
increasing acquaintance with United States' constitutional interpretation of Canadian lawyers and law schools has undoubtedly made us
familiar with its language, if not with its elaboration. But in the
.total conditions of today in Canada, including that widespread familiarity coupled with what will appear, I think, to be the difficulty, apart
from such assistance, of giving content to such unusal language, it
is difficult to say that its use by Parliament has been quite unrelated
to the prominent role it has played in the judicature of the United
States; and although we are not from that fact in any sense to be
led to accept the signification it has there acquired, it would be
unwise, in the interpretation of the qualification of our own declared
rights and freedoms, to ignore the process of reaching a sufficient
degree of definiteness if not of precision for use as a standard through
which it has passed in that country; and, unless it can be given another
and satisfactory, including a more limited, meaning or one of different
character, with whatever modification we see fit to make, the ajudicative modus operandi which has finally been attributed to it in the
United States, is of immediate relevance to the task facing us. It is
therefore appropriate to our examination of the legislation to introduce ourselves in some degree to the development of that interpretation, to clarify the factors of legal theory that have played a part in
the process, to examine circumstances in which the refractory ques-
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tion has been grappled with, and to ascertain the controlling considerations which have finally become operative in its application.
From 1777 to 1789 the thirteen states which had declared their
independence were loosely held in a union called Confederation in
which the political power conceded to the central government was
of meager extent. Its inadequacies were early demonstrated in the
confusion and frustration, chiefly in interstate and international
matters, which the absence of effective power in the national government made inevitable. This recognization led to the calling of another
general convention in Philadelphia, from whose deliberations there
issued, in 1787, the constitution which, with amendments made in the
intervening years added to it, forms the foundation of the federalism
of the United States of this day.
The items of legislative distribution between the national and the
state governments of that republic are of slight concern to the question
now raised. What is of interest is the limitation of legislative powers in
the form of overriding rights and fundamental liberties against legislative, executive and judicial action, subtractive limitations of power
by which the individual for the first time in history is furnished a
group of allodial freedoms on which, from the language in which they
are phrased, inot even the sovereignty of the nation or state may
intrude.
The original terms of the constitution of 1787 contained a number of legislative restraints: limiting the suspension of habeas corpus,
forbidding the enactment of any bill of attainder or ex post facto
law, forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts. The
constitution came into effect on March 4, 1789; in September of that
year amendments were proposed, ten of which passed by the approval
of three-quarters of the number of the then existing states. Of these
amendments, the first secures the freedoms of religion, speech, press,
peacable assembly and the petitioning of the government for redress
of grievances. The 5th, perhaps more than any other familiar to Canadians, is in the following terms:
'No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation".

These amendments up to and including the 8th were interpreted
to apply only to the national government.
Following the Civil War further amendments were passed called
for generally through the effects of the abolition of slavery and the
resulting accession of new citizens for whom, among other objects,
corresponding rights and liberties were sought to be secured against
legislative action by the states. The provisions of interest here are
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contained in the 14th amendment; finally ratified in 1868, the terms
of section I of which are as follows:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

By section 5 of the amendment the Congress is invested with power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions, among others,
of section 1.
It is at once seen that the subjects dealt with in the 1st, 5th and
14th amendments bear on topics which within the last 20 years have
become matters of concern to Canada, culminating in the passage of
the Bill of Rights. We are approaching the point of constitutional completion by acquiring power of amendment to the British North America Act. With that accomplished we shall be in fact an associate state
within the Commonwealth bound to Great Britain by a several allegiance to a common sovereign. In that ultimate status we are
probably bound sooner or later to face evolving demands for specific
constitutional limitation on legislative action expressed in terms similar to those of the Bill of Rights and the United States constitution.
In this we have the advantage of being able to view and benefit from
the history of the travail through which the United States has passed
in its struggle towards the reconciliation of such rights with local or
national administration and regulation; and notwithstanding any
tendency to be critical of some of the social manifestations which have
accompanied that struggle to reach "a government of laws and not
of men", to avail ourselves of whatever benefit that experience may
be able to afford us. For the aim of the administration of government
including justice in that land, made clearer by its powerful' judicial
organs, -has been and is now nothing short of establishing throughout
the entire body of law and executive action the requirement of a
standard of reasonableness expressed as due process, the limit to
which the free scope of action vital to the fullest realization of individual gifts, talents and genius will be abridged to accommodate social
ends. This-necessitates the use in regulation of appropriate, direct and
effective means to desired and justifiable ends, the minimum encroachment on individual independence, and the sensitive balancing of
the considerations supporting both interests. The ultimate determination of this balance and the reconciliation of those interests is the
function primarily of the Supreme Court and the federal courts generally, instances of adjudication by which will evidence as unique and
as complex a judicial accomplishment as the history of judicature
can show.
In the examination of the clause against depriving any person of
life, liberty or property "except by due process of law" the differences
of existing constitutional form and provisions in the two countries
must be kept in mind; and although the course before use in Canada
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will undoubtedly lead ultimately to an expansion of the ideas and
concepts in this field of adjudication, even only a problematical increasing resemblance to the mode of adjustment reached in the
United States will justify a closer acquaintance with what has been
achieved there.
The expression "due process of law" in English legislation appears first in 28 Ed. III Cap. 3 which declares that:
"no man of whatever estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of
land or tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited nor put
to death, without being brought in answer by due process of law".
The next occasion of historic use is that by Coke (2 Inst. 50) in his
examination of No. 39 of the provisions of Magna Carta, "Nisi per
legem terrae,but by the law of the land". He refers us "for the true
sense and expression of these words" to 37 Ed. III Cap. 8, where the
words "by the law of the land" are rendered "without due proces of
law", "for there it is said, though it be contained in the great charter,
that no man be taken, imprisoned or put out of his freehold without
proces of the law; that is, by indictment or presentment of good and
lawfull men, where such deeds be done in due manner, or by writ
originall of the common law". And referring also to 28 Ed. III Cap. 3
and 42 Ed. III Cap. 3, he adds "No man be put to answer without
presentment before justices, or thing of record, or by due proces, or
by writ originall, according to the old law of the land" ... "Wherein it
is to be observed, that this chapter is but declaratory of the old
law of England".
The phrase "by the law of the land" is itself indefinite when used
in a modern context; even in the 14th century it does not seem to have
meant law from time to time as it may be; it was the common law
viewed as rooted in permanence. In 1215 there was no parliament to
consent to and authorize legislation; and what was being extracted
from King John by the barons was the surrender of arbitrary power
and the submission to procedures then established for different classes
of subjects enjoying, according to their status, courts with customary
modes of determining controversies. It was against violation of the
customary by the arbitrary that they rebelled. The 17th century gloss
of "the law of the land", used in the charter, expressed as "due process of law", made to serve the purpose of a commanding legal figure,
was conceived to inhere as reason in the human establishment of
England, as fixed precepts and principles of law by which the Sovereign himself was bound; natural law written in the constitution of
man as part of nature, and expressing itself in the unwritten law,
which not even the statutes of parliament could abridge, abrogate or
supersede without due process, statutes which the courts of common
law could pronounce null and void: Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 114a,
118a. His pronouncement in that case not even his authority associated with Magna Carta could sustain; but it is an historic assertion
that even in the 19th century exercised a remarkable influence in the
exegesis of the United States constitution; "due process" as a symbol
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assumed the form of a cloudy eminence bearing within itself vague
intimations of ancient, inviolable and everlasting principles. With such
indefiniteness it remained until given substance and significance by
the courts of the United States commencing in the last decade of the
19th century.
Previously and throughout that century judicial interpretation
in that country had fluctuated between, exaggeration of rights, privileges, immunities and liberties of individuals on the one hand and
social or state interests on the other. Reflected in this tortuous course
was the basic conflict between the conception of a national dominance
through the enforced provisions of the federal constitution and that
of state primacy through the residual powers of sovereignty in local
administration. In this welter the impact on the many forms of individual security led to a multiplicity of legal theories, the clash of
which in judicial opinion revealed the dimensions of the task imposed
upon the federal courts and the demands on judicial statesmanship
which its accomplishment necessitated.
To most of the issues evoked it is impossible to give even a reference but the problems they presented can be indicated. The Congress is to make no law abridging the freedom of speech: what is
the background of assumptions in relation to which that prohibition
is prescribed? As early as 1798 drastic sedition laws were passed by
Congress and during the past 20 years we have seen the enactment
of laws for the protection of the public against speech aimed at bringing about a revolutionary change in the form of government. Free
speech is seen not to be unlimited and its boundaries become the matter of judicial determination. What type of utterance is intended to
be embraced within "free" speech? Can a distinction be made between
expressions of opinion and those that may be called verbal acts? Is a
false cry of "fire" in a theatre "speech" within the scope of the expression? Is such a cry the type of utterance present to the minds of
those who provided or are concerned with the language? By recalling the arrogant restrictions and limitations in the legal and political
history of England which had given rise to the hatred of shackling
human speech or writing, the expression of an essential faculty of
complete man, we may obtain a clearer notion of what was intended.
That appears to have been the utterance of ideas, opinions and propositions on a universal field of speculation in all its aspects, the communication of those speculations to others as a natural and almost
necessary propensity. Language as an immediate incitement to action
may be denounced as a crime because of its relation to the act which
follows upon it; is this such speech as is intended to be within the
scope of the clause of freedom? When utterance as such is declared
to be a crime, the determination must be made whether the freedom
has been violated, but on what considerations? The word "liberty"
likewise calls for definition. Mere locomotion or freedom from restraint is obviously too narrow; what is contemplated must be the
widest range of action of otherwise unforbidden character. This distributes the field of economic as well as other human activity, and
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its limits are the boundary of valid regulation. The injury by language of reputation, giving rise to civil rights in other individuals, marks
likewise another boundary. In this we catch a glimpse of the working of a categorical imperative as a principle in the reconciliation of
conflicting interests.
These boundaries are the line at which equilibrium of social
and individual values is reached; neither to man as an individual nor
to the community can be attributed absolute paramountcy; and the
necessity of reconciliation is doubly justified by the fact that these
constitutional prescriptions do not arise from assumptions postulating
any such scope. The examples of that adjustment now to be mentioned cannot fail to enlarge and deepen appreciation of the basic
and operative ideas reached to that degree to which in the United
States it has been found judicially persuasive for the courts to go.
The word "due" in the phrase means appropriate or apt, and the
word "process" has its almost evident application to procedure. Can
we confine the language of the phrase to that restricted signification
of existant law, that is, actual procedure as from time to time provided by law? The words import a limitation upon law encroaching
upon the liberties named and made the subject of security, and the
essence of this security would be defeated by confining their effect to
actual procedural apparatus. That apparatus could not by the language used, be restricted to the procedure of a particular time, and
much less to that from time to time by which the intended protection
would disappear. Procedure, obviously, may be of high importance;
the progress of centuries has to some degree crystallized essential
features of modes of ascertaining issues or of the processes of adjudication; and complaints are not against those modes primarily but
their abuse in administration. Obviously those vital interests in procedure, due process must be taken to protect. But to confine its application to them would be to reduce radically the scope envisaged
by the language used. What the prohibition against abridgment of
freedom of speech certainly appears to be directed against, preserving the most meticulous procedure, is substantive law encroaching
upon it; otherwise substantive encroachment could destroy that
liberty. To be given any effect whatever interpretation is essential
even in procedure, to be worked out by means of principle or standard
of balance or reconciliation. That this is so can be seen from the
specific matters of section 2 which prescribe and limit procedure. In
fact, withdrawing these matters from the general head of due process in section 1 leaves a minimal residue of procedure to which it
could apply. That process stands as the limiting factor to social regulation; and the following selected cases from United States courts are
illustrative of the development and transformation of its interpreted
content.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 2:171

One of the earliest was Murray's Lessee et al v. Hoboken Land
Company.2 The question was the validity of a distress warrant directed by an officer of the Treasury against a revenue collector based
upon the balance shown in the public accounts to be owing the United
States, a distress expressly authorized by statute. It was urged that
the effect of the proceeding was to deprive the defendant of his liberty and property without due process. In the course of the judgment
the following language was used:
"The article ds a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive
and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as
to leave Congress free to make any process 'due process of law' by its
mere will. To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain
whether this process enacted by Congress is due process? To this the
answer must be two-fold. We must examine the constitution itself, to
see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If
not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of
proceeding existing in the common and the statute law of England before the immigration of our ancestors and which are shown not to have
been unsuited to their civil and political condition of having been acted
on by them after the settlement of the country".

In the following year, Wynehamer v. the People3 questioned the
validity of a statute which, upon coming into force, prohibited all
sale of and other dealings with intoxicating liquor and made its possession thereafter unlawful; affecting, thus, existing stocks. The Court
of Appeals, New York, held this constituted a taking of property
without due process, in violation of the 14th amendment, illustrating
the individualistic trend then dominant in the jurisprudence of many
of the states. In the course of the reasons of Comstock J. a quotation from the language of Chase J. in Calder and Wife v.Bu7U4 carried the reasoning into the realm of natural law:
"I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that It
is absolute and without control, although its authority should not be
restrained by the constitution or fundamental law of the state. The
nature and end of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This
fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the
laws do not require, nor refrain from acts which the laws permit ...
A law that punishes a citizen for an innocent action, or in other words
for an act which when done was in violation of no existing law - a
law which destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens
a law that makes a man a judge in his own case - a law that takes
property from A and gives it to B. It is against all reason and justice
for a people to entrust a legislature with such powers and therefore it
cannot be presumed that they have done it".

Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck5 was quoted to the following effect:
"It may be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does
not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual,
fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation?"
218 Howard 272 (1855).
313 N.Y. 378 (1856).
4 3 Dallas 386.
5 6 Cranch 135.
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Munn v. Illinois6 presented the issue of whether the state of
Illinois could fix by law the maximum of charges for the bulk storage
of grain in warehouses at places in the state having not less than
100,000 inhabitants, in which the grain of different owners was minxed
together or stored so that no identity of lots could be preserved, an
issue depending upon the same amendment. The legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that the elevators were
affected with a public interest in being devoted to a public use. Mr.
Justice Field, dissenting, stressed the protection under due process
against the deprivation of liberty and of property of a United States
citizen. In the Slaughter House appeal 7 in which a statute of Louisiana had given an exclusive right for 25 years of maintaining places
within certain parishes for slaughtering animals, Mr. Justice Field
had rested his dissent on the provision of the 14th amendment securing against abridgment the "privileges and immunities" of such a
citizen. The majority judgment held that those rights did not extend
to what was claimed to be abridged by the state's action; that, subject to specific rights and immunities attached by the federal constitution to United States citizenship, the privileges and immunities attaching to state citizenship lay exclusively within state power. That
constitution secures to the citizens of each state all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states, which means that a citizen of state A when in state B is entitled to all such rights of the citizens of state B; but that produces no effect between a state and its
own citizens. In Munn, Mr. Justice Field switched his emphasis from
the immunities and privileges to the due process clause.
In Davidson v. New OrTeans s Miller J. speaking for the court
observed:
"It must be confessed, however, that the constitutional meaning or value
of the phrase 'due process of law', remains today without that satisfactory precision of definition which judicial decisions have given to
nearly all the other guarantees of personal rights found in the constitutions of the several states and of the United States...
It is easy to see that when the great barons of England wrung
from King John, at the point of the sword, the concession that neither
their lives nor their property should be disposed of by the Crown, except as provided by the law of the land, they meant by 'law of the land'
the ancient and customary laws of the English people, or laws enacted
by the Parliament of which those barons were a controlling element. It
was not in the minds, therefore, to protect themselves against the
enactment of laws by the Parliament of England. But when, in the year
of grace 1866, there is placed in the Constitution of the United States a
declaration that 'no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law', can a state make anything due
process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such?
To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the states is of no avail,
or has no application where the invasion of private rights is effected
under the forms of state legislation ....

It is not a little remarkable,

that while this provision has been in the Constitution of the
United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government, for nearly a century, and while, during all that time, the manner
in which the powers of that government have been exercised has been
6 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
7 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
8 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
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watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism In all
its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been
invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public
discussion. But while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the power of the states, only a very few years, the docket
of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that
state courts and state legislatures have deprived their own citizens of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . . If, therefore, it were possible to define what it is for a state to deprive a person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in terms which
could cover every exercise of power thus forbidden to the state, and
exclude those which are not, no more useful construction could be
furnished by this or any other court to any part of the fundamental
law".
In Powel v. Penn,9 Mr. Justice Harlan, giving the court's opinion
said:
"The main proposition advanced by the defendant is that his enjoyment,
upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances, of the
privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding and selling property is an essential part of his rights of liberty and
property as guaranteed by the 14th amendment. The court assents to
this general proposition as embodying a sound principle of constitutional
law".

In Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway v. Minnesota,1 0 the Supreme
Court referred to the judgment below as follows:
"It is held that as the legislature had the power itself to regulate
charges by railroads, it could delegate to a commission the power of
fixing such charges, and could make the judgment or determination of
the commission as to what were reasonable charges, final and conclusive. . . . In other words, although the railroad company Is forbidden to establish rates that are not equal and reasonable, there Is no
power in the courts to stay the hands of the commission if it chooses to
establish rates that are unequal and unreasonable.
This being the construction of the statute by which we are bound
in considering the present case, we are of opinion that, so construed, It
conflicts with the Constitution of the United States in the particulars
complained of by the railroad company. It deprives the company of Its
rights to a judicial investigation by due process of law under the forms
and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive ages. By
the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy and
substance therefore, as an absolute finality, the action of a railroad commission which, in view of the powers conceded to it by the said court,
cannot be regarded as clothed with judicial functions or possessing the
machinery of a court of justice".

Here we have probably the first clear extension of due process to a
matter of substantive law as a limitation.

In Allgeyer v. Louisianan again the validity was called in question of a state statute imposing a penalty on any person doing any
act in the state to effect for himself or for another, insurance on

property in the state in any Marine Insurance Company which had
not complied with the laws of the state. Mr. Justice Peckham's statement sums up the issue:
"The Supreme Court of Louisiana says that the act of writing within
that state the letter of notification was an act therein done to effect an
9 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
10 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
3 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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insurance on property then in the state, in a marine insurance company
which had not complied with its laws, and such act was therefore
prohibited by the statute. As so construed, we think
statute is a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the federal the
Constitution, in that
it deprives the defendants of their liberty without due process of
The statute which forbids such act does not become due process of law.
because it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution oflaw,
Union. The 'liberty' mentioned in that amendment means, not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of the
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace his
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; the
to
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood
or
avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which
may
be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out of a successful
conclusion the purpopes above mentioned".

Story expresses a similar view:
"The terms 'life', 'liberty', and 'property', are representative terms,
intended to cover every right, to which a member of the body politicand
is
entitled under the law. These terms include the right
of
freedom of speech, religious and political freedom, exemptionself-defence,
from arbitrary arrests, the right freely to buy and sell as others may. Indeed,
may embrace all our liberties, personal, civil, and political, includingthey
the
rights to labor, to contract, to terminate contracts, and to acquire
property. None of these liberties and rights can be taken
away, except
by due process of law".

One of the striking modern decisions of the Supreme Court,
k 2
rendered in 1905, was Lockner v. New Yorlc
The New York statute
forbade any employee in a bakery or confectionery establishment
to
be permitted to work over 60 hours in any one week, or an average
of over 10 hours a day for the number of days they should work. The
Act was challenged as an infringement of the amendment.
Delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Peckham expressed the conclusion reached in these words:
'We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed
in this case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation
for
holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard
the public health, or the health of the individuals
who are
the
trade of a baker. If this statute be valid, and if, therefore, afollowing
proper case
is made out in which to deny the right of an individual sui
juris, as
emnloyer or employee, to make contracts for the labor of the
under the protection of the provisions of the federal Constitution, latter
would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature there
might
not go".

Mr. Justice Holmes dissented and in the course of his opinion used

well-known language:

"The fourteenth amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics . . . . But a Constitution is not intended to embody
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organica
relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made
for
people of fundamentally differing views and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States".
12 198 U.S. 45.
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The majority view taken in this case and in A7lgeyer (supra) has
been rejected in subsequent cases, e.g., Nebbia, West Coast Hotel,
Olsen and Phelps Dodge Corporation.
The reference in the case to "police power" indicates simply
that exercise of legislative sovereignty which, primarily, in regulation, affects individual liberties and property. 13 It may possibly in
some situations reach regulation beyond those subjects but they constitute the great bulk of its subject matter. We have in the case a
clear application of the due process restriction to substantive legislation; it constitutes a degree of censorship in the court on the reasonableness, in total circumstances, of local enactment and an indication
of the type of considerations determinative of that standard.
4 Mr. Justice
In Whitney v. California,1
Brandeis remarked:
"Despite arguments to the contrary, which had seemed to me persuasive,
it is settled that the due process clause of the 14th amendment applies
to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure".
On the other hand, in Nebbia v. New York' 5 an order of a Milk
Control Board fixing the selling price of milk was upheld. West Coast
6 pronounced
Hotel Company v. Parrish1
valid a minimum wage law
of the state of Washington; in the language of Chief Justice Hughes,
"It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does
not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of
its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded
is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law

against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare
of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject
to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community
is due process".

In Olsen v. State of Nebraska,17 the court reversed a judgment
of the Supreme Court of Nebraska that a statute fixing the maximum
compensation which a private employment agency might collect from
an applicant for employment, was unconstitutional under the due
process clause. In the course of his reasons Mr. Justice Douglas reviewed the general question of price fixing legislation as related to
emergency or business alleged to be affected with public interest. In
the latter case it was "said to be so affected if it had been 'devoted to
the public use' and if 'an interest in effect' had been granted 'to the
public in that use' ". He proceeds:
"that18test, labelled by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in the Ti/son

case,

as 'little more than a fiction', was discarded in Nebbia. It was

there stated that such criteria are not susceptible of definition and
3
Professor Paul E. Freund, one of the leading commentators on the
United States constitution, has defined Police Power as "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property", cited in Professor Dodd's Casebook (supra, footnote 1), page 969.

14 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
15 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

16 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
17 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
18 273 U.S. 446.
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form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of legislation directed
at business practices or prices and that the phrase 'affected with a public
interest' can mean 'no more than that an industry, for adequate reason,
is subject to control for the public good' ".
Phelps Dodge Corporationv. National Labour Relations Board, 9
raised the issue of whether an employer subject to the National
Labour Relations Act might refuse to hire persons solely because of
their affiliations with a labour union. The court, through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals, held that such
a refusal, within the meaning of the statute, constituted an unfair
labor practice for which the company was liable in damages to the
extent of the wages lost to the proposed employees from the time of
that refusal, subject to a deduction of any earnings made by them and
losses wilfully incurred.
In a decision in 1935, Louisville, Joint Land Bank v. Radford,20
a statute of Congress enabling a mortgagor to repurchase land mortgaged at an appraised value thereby depriving the mortgagee of the
security of the land, was found invalid as a deprivation of property
without due process.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain raises the relation
of due process to adequate compensation. The court in Chicago, B.
& 0. R. Co. v. Chicago,21 where the action taken was the opening of a
street over a railway right-of-way, holding the due process clause to
apply, was unable to pronounce the verdict of $1.00 as unreasonably
low.
It may here be remarked to be somewhat significant that in the
Expropriation Act (Dominion) there is no express declaration of a
right to compensation for land taken. The word compensation appears
but the right to it is assumed or implied. Is compensation then for
compulsory taking one of those fundamental ideas which we treat as
underlying legislation affecting individual rights? Its inclusion
within due process is enlightening of the ideas bound up within that
phrase. It may be recalled that in Montreal Railway v. HarbourCommissioners of Montreal,22 the question of taking provincial government property for dominion purposes was in issue. Viscount Haldane
at page 312 said:
"The dominion statute of 1873, while dt was effective to extend the harbour as a harbour and to invest in the Dominion Parliament and in the
Harbour Commissioners the right to make due provision for the control
of shipping in the harbour as extended, did not enlarge the property
nights of the Dominion or enable the Dominion Parliament to take land
for harbour purposes without compensation".
In Nashville C. & St. L. Railway v. Walters,2 3 the Supreme Court
held that due process forbade the imposition upon a railroad of onehalf the cost of grade separation where the railroad received no bene19 313 U.S. 177 (1941).

20 295 U.S. 555.
21166 U.S. 226 (1897).
22 (1926J A.C. 299.
23 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
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fit therefrom; and a similar holding was made in respect of the imposition upon a pipe line company of the cost of changes in the location of the pipe line upon its right-of-way involved in the re-location
of highways: PanhandleEastern Pipe Line Company v. State Highway Commission.24 In the states of Kansas, New Hampshire and North
Carolina, the constitutions of which do not expressly call for compensation for the taking of private property for public purposes, the
courts have reached the same result by holding compensation in such
cases to be required by due process. These particular issues are of
direct relevance to the powers of Parliament in relation to interprovincial and other dominion works, and in particular to the provisions
of the Railway Act.
In Truax v. Raich, 25 the Supreme Court held against a state's
attempt to forbid the employment of aliens resident within the state.
The express statutory requirement was that not less than 80 per cent
of employees engaged by any employer of more than 5 workers at any
one time should be qualified electors or native born citizens of the
United States. Its express purpose was "to protect the citizens of the
United States in their employment against non-citizens of the United
States in Arizona". The invalidity of the Act was founded upon the
14th Amendment which in the due process clause applies to "any
person".
In Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court,2 6 the court held
that a state could not provide for compulsory arbitration of labour disputes in businesses affected with a public interest; and in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters2 the closing of all private schools was held likewise to be a violation of the clause. Gitlow v. State of New York, 28
raised the issue whether the state of New York could create the crime
of Criminal Anarchy, defined as "the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or violence or by the assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive officers of government, or by any unlawful means . . . ."; the statute provided
that any person who "by word of mouth or writing advocates, advises
or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of criminal anarchy or
who prints, publishes, edits, issues or circulates any written or printed
matter in any form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching
the doctrine shall be guilty of a felony". The court upheld the conviction but the interest in the case lies in the dissents of Mr. Justice
Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis. In the course of his reasons the
former used the following language:
"Mr. Justice Brandeis and I are of opinion that this judgment should be
reversed. The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be
taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope
that has been given to the word "liberty" as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpreta24 294 U.S. 613 (1935).
25 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

26 262 U.S. 522 (1923).

27268 U.S. 510 (1925).
28 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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tion than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs
or ought to govern the laws of the United States. If I am right then
I think that the criterion sanctioned by the full court in Schenckc v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249 (63 L. Ed. 470), applies:
'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that [the state]
has a right to prevent'.
If what I think the correct test is applied it is manifest that there
was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by
force on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's views. It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory,
that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself
for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement, at its birth.
The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result.
Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the
redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present
conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given
their chance and have their way. If the publication of this document had
been laid as an attempt to induce an uprising against government at
once and not at some indefinite time in the future it would have presented
a different question. The object would have been one with which the
law might deal, subject to the doubt whether there was any danger that
the publication could produce any result, or in other words, whether it
was not futile and too remote from possible consequences. But the indictment alleges the publication and nothing more".
"Due process" is thus seen to be interpreted as a limitation on
law which to a degree of unreasonableness affects personal liberties or
property. Confining that limitation to the broadest sense of procedure

is incompatible with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Section 2
deals with specific matters of that nature in such detail as virtually
to exhaust the items of importance. If the inclusion were intended to
imply that Parliament can, without repudiating the declarations of
section 1, make any utterance a crime, that substantive law is not
within the scope of due process, that the latter is restricted to what-

ever adjectival rules or jural constructs may lie beyond the enumeration of section 2 which, to adapt the language of Macbeth would "keep

the word of promise to the eyes and break it to the mind", then it
could only be said that the declarations are of no significant value,
wordy symbols signifying little.
What, on its face, is indicated by the Act is the setting up for all
law infringing rights, privileges and liberties, a standard of rational
acceptability in the regulation of human conduct and relations. Pertinent to that would be these considerations:the existence of an evil
to be curbed or a benefit to be provided, in the public interest; the
appropriateness of what is proposed as regulation to the end sought;
the extent to which individual privileges and liberties are encroached
upon; and the relation between the degree of imposition and the good
achieved. That seems to be the natural view of what such law should

be generally and it supports the inclination to hold that the theory
of the social contract necessarily places limits to the exercise of power

entrusted to government. The compact can be viewed as a complete
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surrender of human liberties to a supreme power, receiving in exchange rights and immunities; but that conception of absolutism is
in conflict with the basic assumptions of democratic, politicallyminded men. Without difficulty they can accept a theory of surrender
to government; but the withholding of power to enact measures that
shock deep instincts can in theory be as appropriately assumed as
that the generality of regulation can be conferred.
The contrast to the reasonable emerges in the arbitrary, the
judgment of the unenlightened or the tyrannists. What character of
law is envisaged by section 2 when it provides for legislation preceded
by a declaration that it shall operate in effect to violate the prohibitions previously declared? It would obviously be extreme and extraordinary; the significance is that it is contemplated. Contemplated also
is the period of normal workings in which not parliament but the
courts will judge of the excesses of legislation. With the evident difficulties of application of the standard, it may be asked whether we are
prepared to venture upon the task of establishing under judicial censorship, a body of law in which the individual has preserved to him
against government, the widest practicable measure of free activity,
and the community, that regulation which, through advancing intelligence, enables its life to deepen and expand in reasonable security,
health, strength and the enjoyment of civilization's values? For the
realization of these ends should we remain dependent on the temper
and judgment of parliament or accept the arbitrament of the courts?
Through the vast increase of administrative regulations, the extension
of which is inevitable, dangers multiply of abuse through the effect
on men discharging such functions of exposure to the clamour of many
interests and influences; even in England such dangers have been
shown to be real and grave. On the highest level decisions have been
made which have shocked Parliament, to say nothing of the public.
Power of that sort grows by what it feeds on and arrogance tends
to become its accompaniment. A more remote, disinterested and
disciplined judgment is likely to be able to see in broader perspective
what closer relations to the rough and tumble does not. With the
benefit derived from that objectivity, and as our constitutional
position now stands, parliamentary action might profit from judicial
review. Although popular representatives in their political education
become realistic in certain aspects, it is a mistake to assume either
that limited realism is always a sound basis for legislative action or
that an imaginative sense of realities is denied those who sit in courts
of justice.
The authorities cited sufficiently indicate for the purpose in
hand the variations in theoretical conceptions embodied in or appropriate to the interpretation of due process and in the emphasis in
application which have characterized the course of adjudication in the
United States; they have sought to elaborate corollaries of the
institutions which the provisions of the Constitution were designed to

set up and secure. Those ideas grew out of the historical circumstances

of the time: the arbitrary and arrogant subjection of colonial inter-
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ests to those of a government in which there was no voice to represent
them; the speculation on political theories of democratic society
particularly in England and France, then rife; the emergence of
assertions of individual immunities and liberties beyond the reaches
of law; a spirit of aggressive independence growing out of the selfreliance generated in the isolation and conquest of a new world in
which talents, energies and courage were challenged by a boundless
endowment of natural wealth; all this accompanied by inevitable
suspicion and distrust of government. That these conditions should
lead to an exaggeration of private liberties and their domination in
judicial administration is not surprising. While the vast, pristine
resources remained open to exploitation the function of juristic
reason remained largely that of justifying the dialectic of a detached
logic developed for the protection of those liberties and the limitation
of social regulation. There was conceived such a generalized selfregulating principle involved in the elaboration of those liberties as
would bring about the nearest approach to utopia to which human
beings might aspire. But like all exaggerations, this, in the course of
time, began to exhibit inherent incompatibilities with social justice.
Left out of account was the evolving nature of social institutions
and relations, nor was there sufficiently appreciated the degree to
which man is the product of his society; that the rights and liberties
demanded are to be exercised and enjoyed in that context: and to
organic incorporation they must be reconciled. Within the past one
hundred years western society has been in a state of unprecedented
dynamic change, evolving innumerable new mechanisms of action
which have revolutionized consequential conditions; the multiplication
of forms of property; the institution of the corporation, with its
limitless ramifications, creating a means for the concentration of
economic power undreamt of by preceding ages; contemporary and
parallel organizations of groups, economic, social, political, all similarly proliferating interests, influences, compulsions, and powers
within the welter of which the isolated individual is tossed about like
a cork on the ocean's breast. It is the function of redressing distortions produced by the operations of these forces and tendencies that
is performed by due process. Supplementing them have come immeasurable control over the powers of nature, the preservation of human
life and the menace of population, the limitations of habitable areas,
the necessities of food production, and the ambivalence for good or
evil of every new power brought within control. One needs only to
contrast the present scene with that in the Western world of 1774
to place the more or less detached questions then dominant in their
proper relation to the problems of today.
In such a view of things the changing trend in the treatment
of constitutional guarantees in the United States shown during the
past twenty years can be assessed as a truer and more penetrating
perception of the totality of what was forged in 1787 than any consistent adherence to static ideas could possibly be. It recognizes the

190

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 2:171

flux of the human situation and gives organic viability to the great
ideas there enshrined.
Though that course of adjudication has lessened the emphasis
of the early stages in response to the new conditions, the essence of
its purpose, adumbrated in 1890, has been the restraint of legislative
processes only in that degree in which they are unnecessary and
surplus for protection against imbalances so generated. What are to
be struck down are the gross excrescences which are foreign to ageold traditions of the reasonable, measures which within a substantial
span of time prove their acceptability.
Why not, then, leave the question of what is fair and acceptable
to the determination of legislatures? Whatever the answer to this,
the legislature, by its own declaration, has placed the duty on the
courts which they must accept; and by doing so, it has recognized
that on occasion legislation does not always restrain its action
within the limits of due process. It has accepted the view that under
the conditions in which laws are enacted in our parliamentary system
there may be lapses from those appreciations of inarticulate interests
with which the function of courts is specifically and uniquely charged;
that a detached and objective examination in an atmosphere from
which certainly a wider range of irrelevance is excluded than in a
legislature will probably be able to pronounce a sounder judgment
than that of public debate. Parliament in fact has expressed its
opinion to that effect in conditioning legislation by due process; and
it has presented to judicial tribunals for the first time an opportunity
to elaborate a Canadian jurisprudence within the perspective of the
national ethos of a modern western state.
Undoubtedly the expression is one of difficulty in precise definition; but it constitutes a standard and all standards assessing human
conduct are imprecise in both conception and application: the
"reasonable man" is the creation and instrument of the courts, a
sufficiently difficult example. At certain dimensions we can without
doubt pronounce legislation outside of the bounds of traditional process, as where the issue of river-pilot licenses is limited to persons
of blood relation to presently licensed pilots2 9 ; or legislation that
eliminates most women as barmaids 30 ; or legislation that would
take property for an exclusively private purpose, or for a public
purpose without compensation. With such departures from the norm
of living tradition we have no difficulty and they give a clue to the
character of action which due process condemns. But similar distortions and their consequences more subtle are scarcely avoidable
and it is in that general control, however they may arise and in
whatever context, that due process finds its full function.
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